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Many of Boettke's criticisms of formalist economics are justified.  However, he defines 
it so broadly that it becomes practically synonymous with mainstream economics.  Yet 
he blames it for the specific sins of  formalist economics more narrowly defined.  And 
since he treats Austrian econornics as the only viable alternative to mainstream 
economics he incorrectly awards victory to Austrian economics.  It has some valuable 
ideas to contribute to mainstream econornics, but is not a good replacement for it, 
since it has serious deficiencies. Boettkels  Austrian Critique of Mainstream Economics: 
An Emp.iric:ist  Is Response 
Th0ma.s  Mayer* 
Since the 1S70s economics has u.ndergone  a major revolution,  a 
revolution at least as much in methodology and  "scientific taste" 
as in substantive doctrine. All along economists,  like other 
scientists and serious scholars have treated rigor as an 
important virtue. But now the value attached to rigor relative to 
the other desirable characteristics of a theory, such as 
empirical confirmation and relevance to practical problems, rose 
sharply.  The leaders of this formalist revolution seem to 
classify all economic analysis into mathematically formalized 
models and  "mere  talk". One might be excused for gaining the 
impression that they consider the dichotomy of  "mathematically 
formalized" and "mere ta.lkM  more important than the dichotomy of 
empirically confirmed and empirically disconfirmed. 
Despite its insistence on explicit statements and rigor the 
formalist revolution was not itself founded on a detailed and 
rigorous analysis of why formalism is superior to the older way 
of doing economics.  In place of detailed reasoning its 
proponents offered mere assertions,  often vehemently stated and 
treated as though they were self  -evident. (Cf  .  Montgomery, 
1997,  Backhouse,  1997) Its great success should therefore be 
attributed not to superior logic, but, in part, to its advocates 
being brilliant scholars,  highly respected for their substantive 
work. Another reason is that -  at least to those who confuse 
mathematics and empirical science -  formalism fits the image of 
economics as a science that economists want to project.  Moreover,, because -  within the confines of the model -  formalist analysis 
provides a high degree of certitude, many economists find 
formalism comforting. That it sharply differentiates the 
professimal economist's  product from cocktail-party chatter is 
also satisfying.  In addition, it allowed the young, who generally 
had better mathematical training than their elders, to achieve 
dominance. 
But although the formalist revolution succeeded in establish- 
ing rules that  economist.^ must adhere to if they want to publish 
on mainstream topics in the "respectable"  journals,  it did not 
capture the hearts and minds of all economists. It is not certain 
even that it commands the a.dherence  of half of  all the academic 
economists,  and it is li.kely  th.at  outside of academia only a 
distinct minority of economists accept it. But the tone of 
economics is set by thos:e  who publish in the leading journals and 
teach in the major resea.rch.  universities. There it dominates. 
But by now counter-revolutionaries are active. Peter Boettke 
is one of them. Being a counter-revolutionary myself I applaud 
his attack on formalism, though.  defining it in a narrower way 
than Boettke does. (see Mayer, 1993, 1995). But counter- 
revolutionaries,  like other revolutionaries,  are a quarrelsome 
lot,  so I will criticize some aspects of Boettke's  critique of 
what he calls formalism, arid  not discuss the many points on which 
I can only say "right on." In summary, I criticize Boettke mainly 
for confounding formalism with broader mainstream economics, and 
with thus posing a false dichotomy between formalist and Austrian 
economists, for going too far in his criticism of formalism, as 
well as for overstating the contribution of Austrian economics. But before coming to these criticisms one should note two of 
the strong points of his essay. One is his distinction between 
the idealizations used in economic theory, and the criteria that 
should be used to judge the functioning of an economic system, a 
point discussed below. Emot.ner  is his insistence that when 
discussing broad issues of econ.omic  policy, we have to look 
beyond what economic theory can.  tell us. Institutions do matter. 
Since Boettke gives a prominent role to Abba Lerner as a 
formalist and proponent of market socialism,  who gets it wrong 
because he ignores institutions, it may be appropriate to digress 
with a story Lerner once tc'ld.  He said (private conversation) 
that after he wrote the Ecc~nomics  of Control,  he believed that he 
had shown that it does not matter rriuch  whether a country is 
capitalist or socialist, as long as its managers follow the 
correct optimization rules he had set out. But, he added that he 
preferred socialism beca.use  (if I remember correctly) of its more 
equal distribution of income. However, subsequently he changed 
his mind -  because of  fa.lse  teeth. On a visit to Israel he 
noticed that it did a thriving export business in false teeth. 
This, said Lerner, was l.ogica1  because making false teeth is a 
business that requires much skilled labor and little capital. 
But, Lerner added,  no government planning agency charged to 
increase exports would ever think of false teeth. Since Boettke 
stresses the importance of innovation under capitalism, there is 
therefore much less disagreement between him and Lerner than he 
suggests. 
I. Boettke's Critique of Formalism 
Boettke (1997) writes that in describing economic behavior in mathematical language formalists  drained the real world of  its 
complexity. Hence formalism swept away "historical work on the 
complex web of inst~itutions  that undergird capitalist dynamics" 
(p.  21)  .  Formalists, sulzh as Samuelson,  have "drained economic 
theory of institutional context:.  ... Parsimony won out over 
thoroughness.  "  (p. 22) " [T:l he real problem for economics was that. 
the medium was becoming the message as the strictures of 
formalism denied scientific status to realistic theory. ...  Ideas 
that defied the techniques of  fiormal analysis came to be 
considered unworthy of serious consideration." (p.  21,  emphasis 
in original.  ) 
Boettke's delineation of what he calls formalism thus focuses 
on two separate characteristics. One is its extensive abstraction 
from institutional context. He is right in believing that this is 
required for and fostered by ma.thematica1  modeling.  But not only 
by mathematical modeling. A11 thinking requires abstraction from 
a wealth of detail. When Austrian economists talk about 
entrepreneurship they, t.00,  are abstracting from the real world, 
ignoring, for example, "irrelevant details",  such as whether the 
firm  (entrepreneur)  is a closely held corporation,  or one with 
widely dispersed stockholders who have little power over its 
management. 
Hence Boettke's  complaint that formalism abstracts from real 
world institutions is too sweeping. What matters is whether it is 
the important or the peripheral.  characteristics that are being 
abstracted from. But how do we know which are the important 
ones? When Austrians complain t.hat  formalist economics abstracts 
from the fact that historical time is irreversible,  formalist economists can reply that time bei~g  irreversible is an 
irrelevant characteristics that does not affect the insights and 
predictions generated by their theories. 
Friedman (1953,  Ch. 1)  has argued that until we know whether 
a theory's  predictions are accurate we cannot say whether its 
unrealistic assumptions,  that is its abstractions, matter. An 
alternat.ive  criterion stresses explanation in place of predic- 
tion. Ac:cording  to this criterfion, the right abstractions yield a 
theory that makes us understand the phenomenon,  that provides 
what Fritz Machlup (1978,  p. 145) called a sense of  "Ahaness." 
Though philosophers of science and methodologists argue about the 
choice b'etween  these criteria, most of us pay some attention to 
both, though we differ in the relative weight we give them. Even 
if a theory seems to explain well, in the sense of linking a 
particular phenomenon srnoothly to our prior beliefs,  we do not 
accept it if its predic1:ions  are consistently falsified. 
Conversely, we usually reject as a mere spurious correlation a 
hypothesis that predicts well, but  "makes  no sense." Under 
neither criterion do we reject a theory merely because it 
abstracts. 
One might perhaps respond that some abstractions are so 
obviously wrong that even without knowing how well a theory based 
on them predicts or explains, we can say with confidence that 
this theory must be wrong. But even though there are instances 
where this is correct  (e.g.  ab,stracting  from self-interested 
behavior and assuming firms arje  driven only by altruistic 
motives) are there many such cases in economics? Boettke is able 
to say yes,  only because he takes it as a given in his essay that Austrian theory is correct. Hence,  if formalist economics ignores 
some vari-able  that play a significant role in Austrian theory the 
formalist.  theory must be wrong. But why assume a priori that 
Austrian theory is correct? 
However, a more nuanced ver,sion  of Boettke
ls criticism of  the 
formalists' abstractions is correct.  This is that often 
mathematical modeling not only requires more abstraction than 
verbal an.alysis,  but also that :it seems harder to be mindful of 
some of the abstract~ions  that have been made when we read a 
mathematical analysis, than when we read a verbal analysis (see 
Keynes,  1936, pp. 297-98).  Moreover, it is tempting to decide 
what part of reality to model and what part to abstract from 
more by the criterion of what is mathematically tractable, than 
by the criterion of what is important for the problem at hand. 
What makes this problem worse is that modelers usually do not 
point out that, since they are abstracting from some characteris- 
tics that may be salient, their conclusions are of limited value. 
To be sure, they may seem to guard against this possibility by 
showing that their model gives a good fit to the data, but 
econometric testing, too, is subject to much criticism (See 
Mayer, 1993, Ch. 911 
What is important he:re  (and incidentally is also basic to 
Friedman1s  1953 essay) is that we are using the theory and its 
abstractions to deal wit:h  a particular problem or question. And 
what is a valid abstraction when addressing one question can be 
an lnvalid one when addressing ,another.  When trying to determine 
whether there is a stable relation between changes in bank 
reserves and the money supply we can safely abstract from the fact that the actions of  gover:nment  officials are influenced by 
their self-interest. But we ca:n  not abstract from the fact that 
the ratio of the public's dema:nd  for currency relative to 
deposits varies. Conversely, w:hen  we ask, as Boettke does, 
whether market  socialism cmld  work effectively, we can abstract: 
from the stability of the public's  demand for currency,  but not 
from the motives o:E governiment officials  . 
Boettke's  criticism of  formalism for its heroic abstractions 
is therefore too general. :He  would have to show that these 
abstract.ions  result in theories that neither predict well nor 
foster understanding. To be sure, he does discuss why abstracting 
from the motives that would drive government officials under 
market socialism invalidatlas the formalists  I  advocacy of such a 
system. And although he doles  ~ot  provide any hard evidence,  I 
find his argument plausiblle. But market socialism is hardly a 
central topic in the work of formalists, and it was originally 
presented without formal m'3dels  by Oskar Lange  (19391,  and 
developed further by Abba Lerner (1944),  whose use of mathematics 
generally consisted of simple geometry. Formalists might 
therefore readily concede that Boettke
ls criticism of market 
socialism is correct,  and yet go about most of  their work 
undisturbed. 
The second part of Boettke's  criticism of  fomalism,  that th? 
medium tends to become the message, is valid. Formalists tend to 
evaluate ideas by their su.itability  for modeling, and to judge 
models much too much by their technical sophistication and 
elegance,  and much too little by the insights they provide into 
economic behavior and by t.heir  predictive success.  Deidre McCloskey (1985)  is right in objecting that economics departments 
have appropriated the criteria that are proper for a mathematics 
department,  rigor, generality and elegance. Thus a leading 
mathematical economist and mathematician,  Gerard Debreu (1991,  p. 
5)  wrote: 
I11  the past two decades, economic theory has been 
carried away further by a seemingly irresistible 
current that can be explained only partly by the 
intellectual successes of its mathematization. 
Essential to an attempt at a fuller explanation are 
the values imprinted on an economist by his study of 
mathematics. When a theorist who has been so typed 
judges his scholarly work, those values do not play a 
silent role: they may play a decisive role. The very 
choice of the questions to which he tries to find 
answers is influenced by his mathematical background. 
Thus the danger is ever present that the part of 
economics will become secondary, if not marginal to 
that of judgment. 
The issue  theref  ore not the fact that formalist economists 
use mathematics, but what they use it for,  and the role 
mathematical techniques play in the criteria by which they 
evaluate work. Someone might use a mathematically sophisticated 
and complex model to solve a problem that is central to the 
"study of mankind in the ordinary business of  life", Alfred 
Marshall's  (1947,  p. 1) conception of economics, without 
abstracting from those institutional details that are relevant 
for the applicability of the conclusion, and thereby produce good 
economics.  Someone else who uses no mathematics might tackle a 
trivial problem, or use too restrictive abstractions,  and thus 
produce bad economics. 
To be sure, mathema.tics  is in a way not well suited for 
economics, because  tool for rigorously deriving 
correct conclusions from a,xiorns (i  . e  .  "assumptions"  )  that are beyond question, hardly a good description of  the role of 
assumptions in  economic,^. But t~he  other tools available to 
economists also have their shortcomings. So Boettke's  strictures 
against the use of mathematics are off target. The dispute about 
the feasibility of using mathematics to produce good economics is 
over.2  Trying to re-fight it merely confirms formalists in their 
belief that their critics can be safely ignored. 
There is a third aspect of formalism that Boettke does not 
touch on.  This concerns the purpose for which models are 
constructed and relates to a definition of  formalism that is 
narrower than Boett;kel  s (see Mayer, 1993,  Ch.  3)  .  As an ideal 
type this is the insistence on deriving conclusions to every 
problem explicitly from first principles,  which in economics 
means the assumptions of ut:ilit:y  maximization (in practice of  ten 
narrowed to mean income maximi:zation) and rational behavior, 
along with a minimum of  other assumptions. This type of formalism 
takes as its model not the natural sciences,  but mathematics and 
logic with their relianjze on demonstrative reasoning. By 
contrast,  there is what can be called empirical-science 
economics, again an ideal type. It is more concerned with 
predicting or explaining empirically observable characteristics 
of our economy,  and less with rigor,  parsimony and elegance. 
In practice formalist economists also want their models to 
tell us something that is applicable to the real world, for 
example,  they do not work with models that assume that agents are 
completely altruistic. On the other side, empirical economists 
may sometimes start with the same propositions that formalists 
use. The difference is that formalists are much more likely to tr'eat  these propositions as axioms, while empirical economists 
are more likely to treat them as working assumptions that are 
usually,  but not necessarily always, correct. 
Such a distinction is alien to Boettke's  framework because he 
divides economists into k~stri~ans,  (old) institutionalists, 
Marxists,  and formalists. Since he quickly dismisses institution-. 
alists and Marxists, he only has to show the fallacy of formalism 
to award victory to the Austrians. But that is too facile. It 
tars the substantial ma.jor:ity  of economists with the same brush, 
despite the major methodological differences among them. Those 
who take an empirical approach -  and there are many -  are thereby 
made to share responsibility for the extreme degree to which 
abstraction is carried by those who are formalists by my much 
narrower definition. But to accuse economists such as Milton 
Friedman,  Charles Goodhart, Joseph Stiglitz,  or Paul Krugman, to 
name only a few leading mainstream economists,  of ignoring "the 
complex web of  institutions",  or of putting the medium above the 
message is surely wrong. 
Boettke's  discussion of  the "Chicago School"  illustrates this 
tendency to see all mainstream economists as alike since they 
differ from the Austrians. He does not distinguish between the 
first Chicago School  (e.g.,  Knight, Simons and Mints) which paid 
much attention to the institutional setting, the second Chicago 
School, lead by Friedman and Stigler,  which paid somewhat less 
attention to certain institutions,  but did focus on empirical 
issues and on certain other institutions (see Hirsch and de 
Machi,  1990)  ,  and the third Chicago School (led by Robert Lucas) 
which is formalistic in my narrower sense of the term. Friedman's (1953)  famous methodological essay is often read as a justifica- 
tion for formalism, but that is a mistake.  (See Friedman 1953, 
pp. 11-12,  24-25,  277-300; Hirsch and de Machi,  1990. See also 
Hammond,  1996, Ch. 2) 
But even if  one were to interpret Boettke's  criticism of  what 
he calls formalist economics only as criticism of formalism on my 
narrower definition, it still goes too far. Like most methodolo- 
gists Boettke is a monotheist -  there is only one true methodol- 
ogy.  No trade-off at the margin is allowed. This might be 
appropriate if economics had only one purpose. Now in a sense it 
does: to provide an. expl-anatory  and predictive apparatus that 
ranks extremely high on the cri.teria  of rigor,  elegance and 
parsimony,  as well as on the criteria of accuracy and applicabil- 
ity to many real-world situatims.  But a theory that fully 
satisfies all of these c:rit.eria.  would be a rare find indeed.  So 
there is usually need for a trade-off, or for multiple theories 
operating at different levels of abstraction. 
One can therefore justify some formalist economics on l'art 
pour l'art  grounds because,  like any other piece of rigorous and 
elegant reasoning, it provldes intellectual satisfaction.  If  we 
support research in pure mathematics and in art history for the 
"glory  of mankind,"  we should also support some research in 
formalist economics.  Moreover, some formalist models can be 
justified,  not as the end product of economic analysis,  but as an 
intermediate product. Allan Gibbard and Hal Varian  (1978)  have 
argued that many economic models are "caricature" models, 
intended to highlight some particular feature of  the economic 
process,  even though this gives a distorted picture of the economy. Others can then combine the lessons learned from such 
caricature models to build a more baianced model of the economy. 
The trouble is that putting these caricature models together into 
a realistic description of the economy seems less attractive or 
more difficult than building additional caricature models, so 
that too little of the former and too much of  the latter gets 
done. 
The questioTn is therefore :not whether some formalist 
economics should be done, but how much.  The glib answer that 
some economists give, let the market decide,  will not do.  The 
academic economist's "market"  consists of other academics, and 
not consumers who pay with their own money for what they demand, 
or institutions that are he.ld  c:losely  held accountable by the 
general public or students, the ultimate customers of this 
research. And academics tend to treat as interesting problems 
those that are technically diff.icult,  even if  they do not have 
much bearing on how the economy functions or on policy choices. 
Thus, in academia the intertests  of producers tend to outweigh 
those of consumers. (Are there many other industries with as much 
market failure as academia?) I therefore agree with Boettke that 
there is much too much formalist research (on my narrow 
definition),  but I would not like to see all of  it eliminated. 
11. Markets versus Planning 
Another problem with Boettkels  analysis is his emphasis on the 
problem of free markets versus planning, an issue on which the 
Austrians have focused much of their attention.  This is obviously 
an import-ant issue for economics. But it is only one of many 
issues. Most papers in economics journals either deal with completely different issues,  or if they do deal with an issue 
pertaining directly to free markets versus planning,  they do so 
in a specific and narrow context,  such as flexible versus fixed 
exchange rates. Boettkels  general strictures about the efficiency 
of market processes have relatively little to contribute to such 
discussions, and hence to most of what economists do. 
Mainstream economics devotes much of its effort to small 
questions rather than system-wiide  basic questions. For example, 
the first paper in the latest issue of the American Economic 
Review (September,  1997) deals with an empirical model of 
international specialization,  and the next three papers have the 
following titles:  The International  Transmission of Financial 
Shocks: The Case of Japan,",  "A  Political-Economic Analysis of 
Free-Trade Agreements,"  and "An Empirical Assessment of the 
Proximity-Concentration  Trade-off between Multinational Sales and 
Trade".  Even the two papers in that issue that do compare 
economic systems  ( "Privatization in Eastern Germany:  Management 
Selection and Economic 'I'ra~isit:~on,~  and "Competition  or 
Compensation: Supplier Incentives  under the American and Japanese 
Subcontracting Systems,")  do so in narrowly circumscribed ways. 
This narrow focus has prov13d  fruitful.  Normal-science research is 
how a ma.ture  field,  which economics has become by now, makes its 
day-to-day advances. Boettke a:nd  Prychitko (1944)  tell us that in 
recent years Austrians have moved away from their traditional 
emphasis on ideology. But even so,  their research agenda is still 
too strongly influenced by the "big"  issue of  markets versus 
planning. 
In addition, the issue of  plarming versus free markets is a problem that belongs only partly within economics. As Boettke 
rightly points out it does little good to cmtrast  an idealized 
picture of market socialism with capitalism as it works in 
practice. But determining how market socialism would work in 
practice raises some exceedingly difficult issues on which an 
economist's  expertise is not sufficient. For example, would 
the state, presumably influenced by pressure groups, allow firms 
that should fail to do so and thus cause unemployment? In this 
respect the Chinese experience,  at least so far, is not 
encouraging.  Deeper sociologic~al  questions also arise; what 
elites would replace the capit,alist  elites,  and what effect would 
that change have? 
We know by now that social engineering is fraught with 
uncertainty and danger; the l&w of unintended consequences rules. 
There is a saying in the milit,ary:  "no  plan survives contact with 
the enemy." Something similar applies to economic policy. 
What economists can do muc:h  better than evaluate how market 
socialism would work in practice is to compare the actual 
workings of a market system with the workings of an idealized 
market system. And what one can do  well,  that is what one does, 
particularly if one is an academic. This creates a natural bias 
against the free market, though one that may perhaps be fully or 
more than fully offset by biases in the other direction. Boettke 
is fully justified in c!omplain.ing  about this bias. Where Boettke 
is less justified is in rejecting the work of  those who,  like 
Stiglitz,  have analyzed the implications of  factors such as 
asymmetric information.  Such amalyses can be used as illustra- 
tions of how the actual. functioning of a market system falls short of its ideals. Stiglitz generally does not quantify the 
losses from these shortfalls, and perhaps they are minor. But 
even so,  they exist. St.~dents  of market processes, such as the 
Austrians,  should welcome rather than deplore any work that tells 
us more about how markets operate,  even if it creates a bias in 
favor of planning on part of those who fail to reflect suffici- 
ent~ly  on the shortfalls of actual from ideal socialism. 
111.  Ideology 
Another problem is Boet1:ke1s treatment of rival schools as driven 
by ideology. In one sense ideology is the metaphysical core of a 
research program, and therefore ~nobjectionable.~  In another 
sense, used by those who complain about the ideology of their 
opponents,  ideology is a tendency to accept or reject evidence on 
the basis of whether it fits cne's  preconceptions, and often a 
tendency to select theories on the basis of their policy 
implications, instead of the other way round. As such it is an 
instance of  obtuseness, or lack of intellectual honesty at least 
with oneself, if not with others. To accuse someone or a school 
of being ideological is therefore to make a serious charge, 
albeit in relatively po:Lite  language.  Unless one has evidence to 
back up that type of charge it is better not to make it. To be 
sure, if  an intelligent and well-informed person rejects my 
arguments I am tempted to attribute this to willfulness rather 
than to the unconvincing nature of my argument, which, after all, 
I find utterly convincing. But this temptation should be 
resisted. 
However, there is still another way of looking at ideology, 
to treat it as in undesirable in many cases, but also as natural and as sometimes justified. It :is natural to give more credence 
to evidence that supports one's  position than to evidence thac 
rejects it, if only because this eliminates an unpleasant feeling 
of  cognitive dissonance.  Moreover, in some cases it may be 
justified..  Suppose I have much  evidence that a proposition is 
correct. I am now presented with evidence that it is false. 
Hence, I usually must reject either all the old evidence that 
supports it,  or else the new e~idence.~  Suppose upon careful 
reflection I cannot find any errors in either the supportive 
evidence, nor in the new evidence. One possibility is to say that 
--  do not know whether the proposition is true. But suppose I have 
to make some decision, o.r  that izhe  supportive evidence is very 
strong. It may then be reasonable for me to adhere to my former 
belief,  and to treat the new, contradictory evidence as an 
anomaly that will sooner or later be somehow resolved, even 
7-hough  th.is  makes me see.m  ideological.  6 
For all of these reasons it is better not to attribute 
ideology to one's  opponents. Moreover, it is far from clear that 
one shou1.d  blame, as Boettke does, an anti-market ideology for 
the rise of formalism. Institutionalism can also be used to 
justify i.nterventionism,  and, indeed, has been the traditional 
source of!  interventionis,t  arguments in economics. Moreover, the 
hegemony of formalism can also be explained by self-interested 
'behavior  by economists, so that.  an ideological explanation is not 
needed (see Mayer,  1993, Ch. 2) 
IV. New Keynesians and Post-Keynesians 
Boettke's  treatment of  the new Keynesians does not do them 
justice.  New classical economists had attacked Keynesian theory for lacking micro-foundations for its basic assumption of wage or 
price inflexibility. In response new Keyneslans have shown that 
such inflexibility is consistent with rational income maximiza- 
tion, thus refuting the new classical criticism. To be sure,  they 
have not succeeded in measuring the absolute or even the relative 
importance of the various sources of wage and price inflexibility 
that they analyze (among which the efficiency wages that Boettke 
stresses is not necessarily the most important),  and hence have 
not shown that we do live in a Keynesian or monetarist,  and not a 
new classical world. But their primary task was not that, but 
merely to demonstrate that building models with wage or price 
inflexibility is consistent wit.h a belief in rational utility 
maximization, and does not req-uire any implausible ad hoc 
assumptions. Boettke does not give them sufficient credit for 
that. 
The criticisms of mainstream economics that Boettke and other 
Austrian's make from a right-w
i
ng perspective have much in common 
(both substantively, and in style of  argument) with the 
criticisms made by post-Keynesians, who represent the left-wing 
of Keynesianism. They, like Boettke are critical of formalism and 
its focus on equilibrium,  and like the Austrians they want to 
re-introduce historical time into economics. They also stress the 
prevalence of  uncertainty,  and the inadequacy of treating it witk. 
the tools applicable to decisions-making when the probability 
distribution is known. Suppose one accepts Boettke's arguments 
about the inadequacy of mainstream economics in these respects. 
One does not then have to draw the same conclusions as he does; 
one could become a post-Keynesian instead. Again,  Boettke's tendency to see methodologica:L disagreements in economics as a 
dichotclmy between the Austrians on one side and everyone else on 
the other, muddies the waters. 
V. Austrian Economics 
Boettke's  paper is at least as much a pro-Austrian tract 
as it a criticism of  formalism.  It is useful to distinguish two 
roles that Austrian economics could play. One is to supplement 
mainstream economics, and the other is to replace it. 
Vie.wed  as a supplement:  to mainstream economics Austrian 
economics has something to contribute. Mainstream economics has 
narrowed its vision to a 1.imit.ed  set of ideas that modelers find 
tractable. For example, the modern revival of Walrasian economics 
pays little attention to t.he work of Schumpeter (who, ironically) 
was a g:reat  admirer of Wal.rasi.an  economics),  because his vision 
is too :sweeping  tc be confined within the co~straints  of 
mathematical models. The Austrians therefore have something 
valuable to contribute when they insist that the entrepreneur is 
more than some nondescript. gra~duate  of an MBA program, who 
mechanilzally grinds out the pr-ofit-maximizing solution to a 
standardized problem. Simi.larl.y,  their insistence that price 
competition is only one aspect. -  and not necessary the most 
important aspect -  of the competitive process adds a valuable 
insight that game-  theoret  1-c  models of oligopoly are likely to 
miss. Insistence on entrepreneurs being innovators operating in a 
fog of uncertainty, as well as insistence on irreversible 
historical time, are other Austrian ideas that may deserve much 
more attention than the mainstream gives them. 
One might liken the difference between mainstream and Austrian economics to the difference between a flashlight and a 
lantern.  The former illuminates sharply along a narrow beam. The 
latter provides all-round but less sharp illumination. Whicn one 
is preferable depends on one's purpose, and neither should be 
rejected because the other does some things better. Consider, for 
example, Boettke's  criticis,m  of the equilibrium concept used in 
.mainstream  economics.  He is right in saying that its beam misses 
,much  of what we should see, such as the entrepreneur's creation 
of new goods and new markets, so that some of the criticism of 
product differentiation is simplistic. On the other hand, the 
insight t~hat  markets ten.d  towards equilibrium provides us with a 
powerful tool for predicting how they will respond to certain 
shocks. If economists were to relinquish equilibrium analysis 
they would lose much. Bu.t  if tney fail to see that there is much 
more to market behavior than a tendency towards narrowly defined 
equilibrium, they also lose much.  Both mainstream economists and 
.Austrian:;  have something tc learn from each other. 
Unfortunately,  the lines of communication between them are 
frayed. I doubt that many mainstream economists read any Austrian 
economics,  though this situation may have improved recently. Some 
economists who are not i-dentif  ied as Austrians now taking 
Austrian ideas seriously (see C:aldwell, 1982; Hoover,  1988; and 
Montgomery, 1996). But c:ornn~unic;ations  still need much improve- 
ment. One factor hindering it is the somewhat arrogant belief of 
many mainstream economists that:  the writings of heterodox 
economists,  or for that matter just about all economics written 
prior to the 1970s,  have nothing to teach them. But another reason is the tendency of Austrians to address 
their discussions primarily to each other, to spend too much time 
questio~ing  the purity of each other's  doctrine, and debating 
minor. deviations among the elect; in other words to behave like a 
stereotypical school. 
It is still.  the case, though perhaps now to a lesser extent, 
that an Austrian discussion of a mainstream proposition often 
consists in large part of showing that it is inconsistent with 
Austrian economics, perhaps even that it has been explicitly 
rejected by one of the Founding Fathers. Given the disdain with 
which.  most mainstream economis.ts  treat Austrian economists such 
introversion is understandable -  nor is it necessarily worse than 
the introversion of the formalists (on  my definition),  who tend 
to treat economics as the stud:y,  not of the economy,  but of  other 
economis'ts'  models. But such introversion by either side does not: 
facilitate progress. 
And even when Austrians go beyond condemning some work as 
being un-Austri-an,  their criticisms tend to deal in generalities,, 
such as a failure to recognize the existence of historical time, 
or the use of  illegitim.ate  aggregate concepts, instead of getting 
down into the trenches.  It is easy for mainstream economists to 
ignore such broad criticism and say: "yes,  alright,  but our 
theories work despite all this."  It would be more difficult to 
ignore the Austrians' criticisms if  these would more often 
consist of  evidence (or:  more s:pecifically  of what mainstream 
economists consider evi-dence)  that a particular mainstream theory 
or model fails to predict or ex~lain  because it ignores a 
specific point made by Austrians. More generally,  few makstream economists are likely to 
become converts to Austrian economics in its entirety, but more 
might take specific Austrian ideas seriously if these were shown 
to be re:levant  to their specific concerns,  and were reformulated 
in way compatible with mainstream methodolooical criteria. 
Granted that Austrian economics is built on  philosophical 
foundations that differ sha.rply  from those of  mainstream 
economics, it would "sell"  better if it were sold separately. 
Similarly,  a more politically neutral version might find 
additional markets. Since Austrians are in the distinct minority 
it is up to them to build the needed bridges. 
Austrians may, of course, object that they want to do more 
than bring about a few changes in mainstream economics. But 
aiming at an attainable goal is better than aiming at one that is 
out of reach. Moreover,  a s'eries  of small changes may add up to a 
large change.  One should not ex.aggerate  the incompatibility of 
paradigms. Austrian economi.cs  n.eeds  fewer generals making grand 
plans,  and more privates fighting the war a hill at a time. 
Considered as a substitute for -  rather than an addition to - 
mainstream economics, Austrian economics is not likely to be 
successful. And for good reason. Mainstream economics does have 
many shortcomings,  particul-arly  what I have called formalist 
economics. But it has also has many successes, especially when 
accompanied by an empirical mindset,  as it is in the work of 
economists such as Atkiiison, *erlof,  Friedman, Modigliani, 
Solow,  and Tobin, to mention just a few modern masters.  It has 
produced testable --  and coinfinned -  hypotheses on important 
aspects of  economic behavior (see  Mayer,  1995, Ch. 11).  We would be  he poorer if  this work were to cease, or to become only a 
minor tributary to the stream of economics. 
This is not to deny that over the years Austrian economics 
has also made major contributions. Its contribution to the debate 
(%bout  the feasibility of rational resource allocation under 
socialism is an outstanding achievement, and so is Hayek's  work 
on the role of decentralized information, as well as his earlier 
work on the conditions for neutral money that won him the Nobel 
prize. 
Moreover, since there are many fewer Austrian than mainstream 
~~conomists,  when evaluating the fruitfulness of Austrian 
economics one should look at per capita contributions. But even 
so,  its already discuss concentration on "bign  problems has meant 
,:hat  Austrian economics has paid too little attention to the 
day-to-day problems that constitute the work of  a normal science. 
In Lakatoslan terms, too much of its research concentrates on the 
metaphysical core, and too little on the protective belt. 
Boettke's  (1994) The Elgar Companion to Austrian Economics 
nas a section of short papers on applied economics,  presumingly 
intended to illustrate the fruitfulness of Austrian economics 
when applied to specific problems. I do not think that he 
succeeds. Many of these essays do make valid points, but too 
3ften these are points originally made by economists who are more 
closely identified with mainstream than with Austrian economics. 
Showing that they are also consistent with Austrian economics 
certainly does not discredit Austrian economics, but it fails to 
make a case that Austrian economics should replace mainstream 
economics. When these papers do cite specific Austrian contribu- tions to the problem at hand, :chese  are usually contributions 
made a long time ago, a:nd !chat,  too,  does not suggest that 
Austrian economics is a progressive research program. 
Despite its intellectual ferment in the 1980s (see Lavoie, 
1994a),  Austrian econom.ics  has not been very productive with 
respect to those problems that interest mainstream economists, 
and also, I would argue, that interest the public in general. 
Part of this is due, of course,,  to Austrian theory not providing 
the rationalizations for government intervention that much of  the 
public and many economists welcome. But that is not the whole 
story. While in the hands of an intellectual giant like Hayek 
Austrian economics is a powerful tool,  in the hands of lesser 
economists it is not as powerful a tool as is mainstream 
theory. And that is a serious drawback. Inevitably,  most 
researchers are not giants, and a productive methodology is one 
that provides ways in which they, too, can make useful contribu- 
tions. We should evaluate methodologies not only in the context 
of verification,  but also in the context of discovery. 
The lesser fruitfulness of Austrian economics in the hands of 
most economists is due not only to its focus on "big" problems, 
but also to the much sm'aller  role that Austrians give to that 
great source of work for many economists, empirical work. Many 
Austrians consider econometrics to be useless. Leading Austrians 
reject on methodological grounds the validly of aggregates, such 
as the price level. Thus Hayek (1935, p. 5)  wrote: "from  the very. 
nature of economic theory, averages can never form a link in its 
reasoning." Austrians therefore reject as inapplicable to the 
study of society the instrumentalism that is used so much in the natural sciences. This position strikes me as mistaken, but not 
being a philosopher I will not attempt to discuss it. 
Instead of econometrics Austrians could use economic history 
as a testing ground, particularly if  they are willing to use 
averages. Although some ha-~e  doze so, for example,  to argue that 
an unregulated banking system has worked well in past (for  a 
summary see Schuler, 19!34),  on the whole, Austrians do little 
historical work. Perhaps this is due to their traditional 
rejection of historicism. But economic history can be used both 
to support and make use of economic theory, and not as a 
substitute for it. So it is not surprising that some Austrians, 
Boettke among them, are now urging Austrians to make more use of 
economic history, and to test both the correctness and explana- 
tory power of their theories. (see Boettke, Horwitz and 
Prychitko, 1994) Indeed, Boettke (1994,  p.  5) has argued that to 
say that Austrians reject empirical research is: "a  misreading of! 
the Austrian tradition", though he adds that Austrians also 
believe that: "the signifilzant debates in the social sciences are 
theoretical debates." 
All the same, perhaps because they want to engage in the more 
significant debates, Austrians do iess empirical work than 
mainstream economists do. Another reason might be that many 
Austrians adhere to a mentalist subjectivism that suggests that 
empirical work is not likely to be successful (see Lavoie 
(1994b).  By rejecting eco~?,ometrics  and making only very limited 
use of economic history Austrians have denied themselves the 
opportunity to test their theories, though this has changed a bit 
in recent years (see Lavoi-e,  1.994a). Austrians might respond, along with some mainstream 
economists (see for instance Robbins, 1932)  ,  that empirical 
testing is not needed,  that a valid logical chain from axioms we 
know from introspection and casual observation tc be true 
suffices.  But while that may allow us to argue that a certain 
effect does occur, it usual-ly  cannot tell us whether it is 
significant or not. For example, Hayek  (1935)  attributed business 
cycles to the changes in the relative prices of various goods 
induced by changes in the money supply. Skeptics might respond 
that, while such relative price changes may contribute to 
business cycles,  it. is possible that they explain only a trivial 
proportion of the fluctuations we experience as business cycles. 
Similarly, for a long time Austrians have talked about the 
importance of  comp1ement:arily  zimong various types of capital.  But 
how much complement.ary  is there? Only recently has an economist 
(and one who has only tenuous links with the Austrians) provided 
empirical evidence that such complementarity does matter 
empirically (see Montgornery, 1996)  . 
VI. Conclusion 
In summary then, Boettke's  criticism of what he calls "formalism" 
goes too far. He defines formalism too broadly because he sees 
methodological disputes through the lense of Austrians versus 
everybody else, thus ig:nor:ing  some basic distinctions among the 
"everybody else". In particular he overlooks the important 
empiricist tradition in econom:ics. 
All the same, though I have not discused these points, there 
is much in his criticisms of fl~rmalism  (if it is narrowly 
defined) that is correct and well argued. Moreover,  his essay does serve a useful function in drawing attention to Austria~ 
economics, which has some important ideas to contribute :o  a 
synthesis.  But substituting Austrian economics for what Boettke 
calls formalism, or awarding it the main role in such a 
synthesis,  would be a mistake. 
ENDNOTES 
Thomas Mayer,  Department of Economics,  University of Califor- 
nia,  Davis, telephone (510) 549-0504, telefax 549-9472; wishes 
to thank for helpful comments Kevin Hoover and Michael 
Montgomery. 
For other problems with modeling see Mayer  (1996). 
Those who criticized the use of mathematics in economics made a 
bad case by arguing that it is of little use. There is by now 
massive evidence to the contrary. They should have made their 
c'ase,  not against the use of mathematics, but against the 
over-emphasis on mathematics, and made their case on two 
grounds. One is McCloskey's  (1985) charge that the values 
appropriate for a mathematics department threaten to overwhelm 
economics, and the other is opportunity cost. Obviously, other 
things being equal, an economist who knows more mathematics is 
better equipped to do research than one who knows less. But 
other things are not equal. The more time students spend 
learning mathematics, the less time they have available to 
learn economics, though, admittedly the shift from language 
requirements to a math.  requirement was clearly beneficial. 
Similarly,  given the amount of time economists spend on 
research,  and given the a.vailable  space in journals and books, 
the number of  hours an economist spends on a paper is fixed. 
The more of this time is spen.t  polishing the mathematics, the 
less time is available for ch.ecking  the correctness of the 
analysis in other ways. 
In Bergamo (Italy)  I saw just. below the dome of  a church a 
fresco that can be seen -  and seen only faintly -  from the top 
of a certain towers. Presumably it was painted  "for  the glory 
of God",  not for people's  enj~oyment  or instruction.  One can 
justify some papers in Econometrics that almost nobody can read 
in the same way. Given how few readers even most not very 
technical papers in economic journals have, and how unlikely it 
is that they will have any influence on policy or economists' 
thinking, one might argue that most of them are best justified 
as "for  the glory of God or mankind." 
One might, however, object that in the social sciences 
knowledge is so preca.rious  that one should limit as much as 
one reasonably can thl3se propositions that are privileges as uncontroversial. Many ideological propositions would then nor 
qualify for the core. 
But that is not always so. In some situations it is reasonable 
to hold two conf:Licti.ng  views (see Foley,  1979)  . 
Here is a concrete ex'ample.  Phillip Cagan (1965)  found that 
being covered by a corporate pension scheme induces households 
to save more on their own. This implies an increasing marginal 
utility of wealth, and therefore conflicts with the well 
established belief that margfinal utility decreases as one 
obtains more. I t~herefore  did not accept Caganrs  findings, 
though I could find no fault with his analysis. Subsequently, 
when Cagan's  data were re-analyzed,  it turned out that they 
were wrong. 
Boettke (1997,  p.  30) recognizes this when he writes that: 
"Equilibrium theorizing :is not be rejected, according to Hayek, 
but its real purpose must be constantly kept in mind. Formal 
modeling can be a very good servant, but a poor master." 
However, the general imp:ress:~on  that Boettke gives is of a 
strong condemnation of  ecpillbrium theory. References 
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